For most readers, listeners, and scholars, it feels natural to speak of a novel, a symphony, or a poem as if it were a stable entity that exists independently of any particular performance or printed copy. A literary work such as The Judgement or a musical work like The Rite of Spring seems to have both a physical presence and an intangible content that transcends individual instances. Yet in a detailed Open Access analysis, Anders Pettersson argues that this everyday conception is logically inconsistent and has hindered theoretical discussions in literary studies and musicology.
Pettersson begins by examining the way ordinary language treats works of art. Phrases such as "I read Kafka's The Judgement" or "I listened to Stravinsky's Rite of Spring" suggest that a work exists as a single thing that can appear in many places at once. The notion is convenient in daily situations, and it matches the effortless way people understand linguistic and musical meaning. But according to Pettersson, it does not withstand philosophical examination. A material copy of a novel contains only ink and paper, while the supposed "content" exists only because a reader reconstructs meaning from those marks. Likewise, a musical performance is a set of physical sounds, not a container holding a unified non-physical entity.
This leads Pettersson to a key distinction: the difference between mind-independent reality and mind-dependent constructs. Mind-independent entities - such as stars or physical objects - exist regardless of human concepts or institutions. Mind-dependent entities, such as laws, marriages, or academic disciplines, depend on human agreement, conventions, and interpretation. Pettersson argues that literary and musical works clearly belong in the second category. They exist because people interpret and coordinate their ideas around a shared label, not because there is an independent object underlying all instances.
He further notes that many philosophical theories in analytic aesthetics have treated works-themselves as abstract objects. Some view them as types instantiated by physical tokens; others as abstract structures accessible through performances or copies. Pettersson reviews these positions and suggests that they rely too heavily on pre-theoretical intuitions inherited from everyday language. Statements such as "this work contains a G sharp in measure seven" or "the novel has this theme" appear to make sense, but only because people unconsciously mix the physical and the conceptual into a single hybrid entity. For Pettersson, this is exactly the problem: the ordinary conception is a fusion of incompatible elements.
Instead of defending the ordinary notion, he proposes a simpler model. What really exists, he argues, are physical instances - pages, scores, performances - and mental events: the thoughts, interpretations, and meanings that arise in readers and listeners. The "work" is a convenient projection that organizes these processes, but it is not a separate entity. He points out that a manuscript, a published edition, and a performance have their own specific qualities and histories, none of which require the existence of a separate abstract work to bind them together.
Pettersson critiques several common arguments used to defend the existence of abstract works. One suggests that true statements about works imply their existence, but this assumes that ordinary language reliably maps onto mind-independent reality. Another argues that works must exist because they guide judgments about correct performances or editions. Pettersson counters that editors and musicians rely on human practices, historical evidence, and interpretive norms - not on an invisible abstract work - to determine fidelity.
A further argument claims that encounters with performances or copies allow people to perceive the abstract work indirectly. Pettersson challenges this view by noting that perception, in its ordinary sense, involves sensory experience of physical phenomena. Abstract entities cannot be heard or seen, even metaphorically. Claims that one "hears the work" are, he argues, linguistic shortcuts referring to hearing a performance.
The implications of this analysis extend beyond ontology. If literary and musical works do not exist as stable, mind-independent objects, then theories of meaning, interpretation, and authorship must shift their foundations. Pettersson argues that debates over the "true meaning" of a work or the authority of an author's intent rest on artificial assumptions about the object being interpreted. Once the work-itself is replaced with physical instances and mental events, interpretive questions become more about practices, contexts, and conceptual frameworks than about uncovering an inherent, fixed meaning.
Pettersson emphasizes that this does not diminish the value or reality of artistic experiences. Readers still read, listeners still hear, and meaning is still constructed and shared. But these processes rely on coordinated human cognition, not on abstract entities waiting to be discovered. For practical purposes - such as cataloguing, teaching, or discussing the arts - the everyday concept of a work remains useful. It becomes problematic only when elevated into a metaphysical object.
He concludes by suggesting that aesthetic theory may benefit from shifting its underlying conceptual schemes. Instead of attempting to repair the contradictions of the work-itself model, scholars can adopt a framework that acknowledges the interplay between physical instances and human interpretation. This reframing, he argues, provides a more coherent foundation for studying how literature and music function in actual creative and experiential contexts.
In this context, the argument is not that "works do not exist," but rather that the way they are conceived should match their operational reality. They are mind-dependent constructs - real in their use, but not in an ontological sense that would require a stable abstract object.
DSA reflection
Through the lens of Seven Reflections' Dimensional Systems Architecture, Pettersson's analysis highlights how cognitive structures act as organizational fields rather than reflections of external objects. A literary or musical "work" functions as a stabilizing node within a shared cognitive field, not as a discrete entity in the world. DSA distinguishes between structural interfaces and the underlying processes they coordinate; Pettersson makes a similar distinction, showing that the "work" is an interface that binds dispersed instances and interpretations into a coherent form for human use. It exists because the system requires coherence, not because a corresponding object exists in reality. This reinforces a central DSA insight: many elements that appear external are actually internal cognitive architectures projected outward for collective coordination.
